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This paper discusses whether religious freedom is a norm sufficiently well established in international law 
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which has shut down previous attempts to create a constitutional bill of rights. 
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A Commonwealth Religious Discrimination Act for Australia? 
 
Keith Thompson 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
This paper observes that even though the Commonwealth of Australia has 
unsuccessfully tried to implement a full range of human rights in the Constitution on a 
number of occasions, the Parliament already has the power to implement human rights 
in Australian domestic law by virtue of the external affairs power in the Constitution. 
That power has previously enabled comprehensive legislation in relation to race, gender 
equality and workers’ rights. 
 
Separate Commonwealth laws could be passed for each human right in the 
international human rights instruments that Australia has ratified. That is what 
happened with the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), the Sexual Discrimination 
Act 1984 (Cth) and the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth). Alternatively, a 
comprehensive Human Rights Act that mirrored or was premised on the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the Covenants on Civil and Political, and 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICCPR and ICESCR) could be undertaken. The 
individual rights approach seems more likely to succeed since it worked in 1975, 1984 
and 1988 while attempts to protect human rights as a whole by placing them in the 
Constitution have always failed. The legislation of individual human rights would 
enable specific debate about that right and avoid the generalised opposition that arises 
in Australia when a comprehensive constitutional bill of rights has been proposed. This 
individual approach could also tailor human rights to Australian requirements rather 
than simply adopt overseas boilerplates.  
 
My suggestion in this article is that our next human rights implementation effort 
should focus on freedom of religious belief and practice. I make that suggestion because 
it is arguably the most foundational human right that is not yet protected in Australia 
and because concerns with the adequate protection of this right have seen religious 
organisations oppose previous attempts to create a constitutional Bill of Rights in 
Australia. Freedom of conscience and belief was also the subject of an international 
declaration which was ratified by Australia in 1993,1 a declaration that the Australian 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) recommended that 
Australia should implement in 1998 though that recommendation has not yet been 
followed.2 If religious organisations were convinced to support a detailed and specific 
Commonwealth Act protecting religious belief and practice as part of conscience, then 
it is possible that organized religion might later support other elements of the human 
rights project. 
                                                     
1 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion 
or Belief, (the ‘Religion Declaration’) Proclaimed by General Assembly of the United Nations on 25 
November 1981 (resolution 36/55); reaffirmed by the United Nations by resolution 48/128 in 1993, and 
declared “an international instrument relating to human rights and freedoms for the purposes of the 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth) by Michael John Duffy as 
Commonwealth Attorney-General on February 8, 1993. 
2 Article 18, Freedom of religion and belief, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 
Australia, 1998. 
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 I address this task in two parts. First, I explain why the Commonwealth Parliament 
already has the power to implement such legislation even though previous attempts to 
enact a constitutional bill of rights have always foundered. That discussion will focus 
on previous High Court jurisprudence surrounding the Commonwealth Executive and 
Parliament’s external affairs’ power to implement declarations, treaties and 
conventions which manifest ‘international concerns’. In Part II, I suggest why freedom 
of conscience and belief should be Australia’s next federal human rights project. In 
part, that is because religious organisations and individual religious believers in 
Australia have been concerned that freedom of conscience and belief is not and cannot 
be adequately protected by human rights laws. To answer that concern, I show that 
religious freedom legislation need not follow the brief generalities of familiar human 
rights precedents, but can be tailored to answer specific concerns.  
 
I then suggest that the protection of minority freedom of conscience and religion in 
a comprehensive Religious Freedom Act would contribute to a more favourable view 
of human rights legislation generally in Australia and in time, could lead to the more 
complete domestic implementation of the ICCPR. I acknowledge that secular liberal 
elites in Australia will reject my suggestion that a comprehensive Religious Freedom 
Act, would enhance the quality of Australian society. I also acknowledge that some 
believe that a just Australian society would be more quickly achieved if homogenous 
belief were coerced by the suppression of all speech and action that vilified or offended 
minorities. Without canvassing the voluminous literature which exists around that 
argument, I explain why I believe that a tolerant and respectful society is the more likely 
product of a society which fully respects freedom of conscience and belief where that 
belief does not interfere with public safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of others. 
 
I conclude that Australian experience with the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 
(Cth) and the Sexual Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) confirm that a Commonwealth 
Religious Freedom Act could answer the concerns of organized religion about freedom 
of religious belief and practice in Australia. Such legislation could also give judges 
clear direction on how anti-discrimination legislation should be interpreted when it 
conflicted with religious freedom consistent with Australia’s international 
commitments under the ICCPR and the Religion Declaration. 
 
II.  Commonwealth Legislative Power 
 
The High Court has consistently held that international legal obligations have no 
effect in Australian domestic law until they are given effect through Australian 
domestic legislation.3 The High Court recognized as early as 1949, that domestic 
Australian legislation could be justified under the external affairs power if such 
legislation was necessary to prevent sedition against any of Australia’s allies.4 The 
                                                     
3 In Chow Hung Ching v The King (1948) 77 CLR 449, Dixon J said that the ratifying of a treaty only 
committed externally and had “no legal effect upon the rights and duties of the subjects of the Crown” 
(ibid 477-478). The High Court has followed this view in many subsequent cases including Dietrich v 
The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292 (per Mason CJ and McHugh J) and Kiao v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 
(per Gibbs CJ). 
4 R v Sharkey (1949) 79 CLR 121, 136-137 
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majority of the Court built upon that reasoning in the Seas and Submerged Lands Case5 
when it decided in 1975 that the external affairs power justified Australia’s assertion of 
sovereignty over submerged sea-bed land in the continental shelf well beyond the 
traditional 12 mile limit. But there has been continuing diversity as to whether the 
external affairs power is engaged in cases of ‘mere externality’, if the underlying 
matters were merely issues of ‘international concern’, or whether Australia must have 
also accepted obligations under a formal international treaty.6 What is now settled and 
is most relevant for the purposes of this article, is that following the Tasmanian Dam7 
and Industrial Relations Act8 cases, Australian domestic legislation can always be 
justified under s 51(xxix) if that legislation is necessary to implement a commitment 
that Australia has made in a treaty. Perhaps the first step in that direction was taken in 
the decision in Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen where the High Court rejected 
Queensland’s challenge to the validity of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) 
which had been passed to implement Australia’s obligations under the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.9  
 
Even though the Koowarta decision is more than 30 years old, and several other 
panels of the High Court have considered the reach of the external affairs power since, 
that decision along with the decision in the Industrial Relations Act case10 arguably 
provide the last High Court word on the question of how closely follow-on 
Commonwealth domestic legislation must track the relevant treaty to be a valid exercise 
of the external affairs power in s 51(xxix). The following discussion of the scope of the 
external affairs power outlined in Koowarta and in the Industrial Relations Act case, 
                                                     
5 New South Wales v Commonwealth (Seas and Submerged Lands Case) (1975) 135 CLR 337. Note 
that while “the whole Court” found “that the provisions of the [Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 
(Cth)] relating to the continental shelf were within the legislative power of the Commonwealth under s. 
51(xxix) of the Constitution” (ibid 338, headnote [1]), there was diversity as to whether that power 
arose because of the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the law of the sea, because of the power to authorize 
laws “with respect to Australia’s relationships with foreign countries” (ibid headnote [2]), or merely on 
the ground that the waterways concerned were external to Australia.  
6 For example, note that Brennan J in Polyukhovich v Commonwealth (War Crimes Act Case) (1991) 
172 CLR 501 thought that mere externality was not enough to engage the external affairs legislative 
power; there must additionally be a ‘sufficient Australian connection’ (ibid, 550-552), and though he 
agreed with the majority in the Tasmanian Dam Case (1983) 158 CLR 1 that the external affairs power 
could be used to implement any treaty obligation assumed by Australia, he maintained that there must 
be strict conformity with the treaty obligations. In the different factual context of XYZ v 
Commonwealth (2006) 227 CLR 532, Callinan and Heydon JJ rejected the argument that Australia 
domestic legislation could be justified under s 51(xxix) solely on the grounds of geographic externality. 
They considered instead that the constitutional ‘external affairs’ phrase, only authorised legislation 
necessary to preserve Australia’s relationships with other countries (ibid , 586-592). Winterton’s most 
recent editors have accordingly questioned whether it is correct to assert that the High Court has 
accepted Evatt and McTiernan JJ’s assertion in R v Burgess; Ex parte Henry (1936) 55 CLR 608, 687 
that the external affairs power extends to authorise domestic legislation to implement mere 
international recommendations or draft international conventions (Winterton’s Australian Federal 
Constitutional Law, Commentary and Materials, Peter Gerangelos (General Editor), 3rd ed, Lawbook 
Co., Pyrmont, NSW, 2013, 648). 
7 Commonwealth v Tasmania (Tasmanian Dam Case) (1983) 158 CLR 1. 
8 Victoria v Commonwealth (Industrial Relations Act Case) (1996) 187 CLR 416. 
9 Opened for signature 21 December 1965, 660 UNTS 195; entered into force 4 January 1969, and 
ratified by Australia on 30 September 1975 which is the same day as the Racial Discrimination Act 
1975 (Cth) was passed. 
10 Victoria v Commonwealth (Industrial Relations Act Case) (1996) 187 CLR 416. 
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will also review the Full Federal Court’s subsequent treatment of the same issues in 
Toben v Jones in 2003.11 
 
The scope of the external affairs power in the ‘Koowarta’ and ‘Industrial Relations 
Act’ cases 
 
John Koowarta challenged the Queensland Government’s refusal to transfer a lease 
of Wik homelands to him as a member of the Wik aboriginal nation as a breach of the 
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). Queensland defended by asserting that the 
Commonwealth Government did not have constitutional power to pass the Racial 
Discrimination Act 1975 upon which Mr Koowarta relied. Gibbs CJ said that 
 
[t]he crucial question in the case [wa]s whether under the power given by s. 
51(xxix) the Parliament can enact laws for the execution of any treaty to which 
it is a party, whatever its subject-matter, and in particular for the execution of a 
treaty which deals with matters that are purely domestic and in themselves 
involve no relationship with other countries or their inhabitants.12 
 
Gibbs CJ was concerned that too liberal an interpretation of s 51(xxix) would remove 
“[n]early all the limitations imposed upon Commonwealth power by 
the…Constitution” and engage “a unitary system of government”13 and so found that 
 
an international agreement w[ould] only be a valid law under s. 51 (xxix) if the 
agreement [wa]s with respect to a matter which itself c[ould] be described as an 
external affair…[and] if the provisions to which it g[ave] effect answer that 
description.14 
 
Because “[a]n Australian law…designed to forbid racial discrimination by Australians 
against Australians within the territory of Australia [was not]…international in 
character”,15 “ss. 9 and 12 of the Act were not within the legislative power conferred 
by s. 51(xxix) and [we]re invalid”.16 
 
While Aickin and Wilson JJ agreed with the Chief Justice, Stephen, Mason, 
Murphy and Brennan JJ did not. They interpreted the Commonwealth’s power under s 
51(xxix) more liberally. Stephen J said that because areas of international concern were 
“ever expanding”17 and “because Australia had assumed an international obligation to 
suppress all forms of racial discrimination [which norm had become]…part of 
customary international law…the subject of racial discrimination should be regarded 
as an important aspect of Australia’s external affairs”.18 There was also “a quite precise 
treaty obligation…which call[ed] for domestic implementation within Australia.”19 
 
                                                     
11 Toben v Jones (2003) 199 ALR 1. 
12  Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 168, 192 [23].  
13 Ibid 199 [29]. 
14 Ibid 200 [31]. 
15 Ibid 202 [34]. 
16 Ibid 203 [36].  
17 Ibid 217 [25]. 
18 Ibid 220 [35]. 
19 Ibid 221 [36].  
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For Mason J, because the Commonwealth powers in s 51 were plenary, they 
were “to be construed liberally, not narrowly and pedantically”.20 He continued that the 
power to pass laws implementing treaties passed by virtue of the external affairs power 
only required the Court to determine whether the relevant treaty was genuine.21 It was 
 
illegitimate to approach any question of interpretation of Commonwealth power 
on the footing that an expansive construction should be rejected because it will 
effectively deprive the States of a power which has hitherto been exercised or 
could be exercised by them.22 
 
As O’Connor J had said in Jumbunna Coal in 1908,  
 
the Court should, in my opinion, always lean to the broader interpretation unless 
there is something in the context or in the rest of the Constitution to indicate 
that the narrower interpretation will best carry out its object and purpose.23 
 
For Mason J, “the existence of a treaty [wa]s [not] an essential pre-requisite to 
the exercise”24 of the Commonwealth’s power in s 51(xxix). Following the High 
Court’s reasoning in Burgess and Airlines (No. 2), that power might be exercised if a 
matter had “becom[e] the topic of international debate, discussion and negotiation”25 
and it certainly covered “the implementation of the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.”26 
 
For Murphy J, “there [wa]s an external affair whenever Australia [wa]s involved 
with any affair…outside Australia”.27 In the case of the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, because Australia had been complaining almost 
daily about “violations of human rights in other countries…[t]he Executive 
Government's concern with racial discrimination in Australia [wa]s related, perhaps 
inextricably, to its concern with racial discrimination elsewhere”28 and brought the 
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) “easily within the external affairs power as an 
implementation of this treaty.”29 
 
For Brennan J, s 51(xxix) was “available to support [a] law” “[w]hen the 
subject-matter of [the] law [wa]s the subject of a treaty obligation and [wa]s 
‘indisputably international in character’”.30 Though “a colourable attempt to convert a 
matter of internal concern into an external affair would fail”,31 quoting Windeyer J in 
                                                     
20 Ibid 223 [5].  
21 Ibid 224 [6]. 
22 Ibid 226 [14].  
23 Ibid 227 [15] quoting O’Connor J in Jumbunna Coal Mine N.L. v. Victorian Coal Miners' 
Association (1908) 6 CLR 309, 368. 
24 Ibid 234 [30]. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid 234 [31-32].  
27 Ibid 237 [2]. 
28 Ibid 239 [10]. 
29 Ibid 241 [13].  
30 Ibid 256 [8]. 
31 Ibid 260 [14].  
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Airlines (No. 2), "a law necessary to give effect to a particular treaty obligation of the 
Commonwealth is a law with respect to external affairs."32  
 
However, Brennan J was explicit in the Polyukhovich33 case nine years later 
against all his brethren on that Court, that the Commonwealth was not empowered by 
s 51(xxix) to pass laws about just anything external to Australia. In that later case, he 
said the Commonwealth had to demonstrate an Australian nexus – “[t]he ‘affairs’ which 
[we]re the subject matter of the power, [we]re…the external affairs of Australia, not 
affairs which have nothing to do with Australia”.34 The problem with the laws in the 
Polyukhovich case was that they retrospectively criminalized actions that had taken 
place wholly outside Australia before Polyukhovich was an Australian resident or 
citizen. But Brennan J was satisfied with the Australian connection with the treaty in 
the Koowarta case. In that case, he also explained how the Australian domestic law 
must conform to the provisions of the treaty which the domestic law was implementing. 
He said: 
 
It remains to inquire whether ss. 9 and 12 of the Act, which are the only 
provisions upon which Mr Koowarta’s claim for relief might depend, were 
enacted in performance of Australia’s obligation under the Convention. It was 
righly conceded that ss. 9 and 12 were enacted in implementation of the 
Convention. If there were a disconformity between ss. 9 and 12 on the one hand 
and the Convention obligation on the other, the Convention obligation might 
fail to stamp the character of an external affair upon some part of the subject-
matter of ss. 9 and 12, and further consideration would have to be given to their 
validity (cf. R. v. Burgess; Ex parte Henry; Airlines of N.S.W.[No.2], esp. per 
Menzies J. (48). 
If there had been a material disconformity, it may have been necessary to 
consider whether any parts of ss. 9 amd 12 which were not in implementation 
of the Convention might have been supported as an appropriate legislative 
means of performing an obligation to elimination racial discrimination as an 
obligation binding in international law dehors the Convention. It is unnecessary 
to examine the nexus between a non-treaty obligation and a law enacted in 
purported reliance on par. (xxix) in performance of such an obligation. I would 
defer that examination until the circumstances of some particular case require 
it. It suffices in this case that ss. 9 and 12 were enacted in performance of the 
Convention obligation and therefore valid.35  
 
Changes in the composition of the Court between 1983 and 1996 saw a much 
more unified decision in the Industrial Relations Act Case in 1996. In that case, the 
question was whether the Commonwealth had power under s 51 (xxix) of the 
Constitution to pass amendments to the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth) by virtue 
of various international Conventions and Recommendations which the Executive had 
ratified and whether the domestic laws that had been passed sufficiently conformed to 
those international Conventions and Recommendations. The joint judgment of Brennan 
CJ, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ found that  
 
                                                     
32 Ibid 258 [12]. 
33 Polyukhovich v Commonwealth (War Crimes Case) (1991) 172 CLR 501. 
34 Ibid 550-551. 
35 Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 168, 260-261. 
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[i]t would be a serious error to construe part (xxix) as though the subject matter 
of those relations to which it applied in 1900 were not continually expanding.36  
 
Despite his dissent in the Tasmanian Dam case because the continuing 
expansion of s 51 (xxix) left the external affairs power open-ended as a matter of 
constitutional theory,37 even Dawson J concurred in a separate judgment.  
 
In the words of the joint majority 
 
To be a law with respect to ‘external affairs’, the law must be reasonably 
capable of being considered appropriate and adapted to implementing the 
treaty.38 
  
However, in the Industrial Relations Act Case, the Court held that some of the 
provisions in the follow-on legislation were invalid because they were not ‘appropriate 
and adapted’ to the purpose of the international instruments relied on in that case.39 
Brennan CJ, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ explained: 
 
When a treaty is relied on under s 51(xxix) to support a law, it is not sufficient 
that the law prescribes one of a variety of means that might be thought 
appropriate and adapted to the achievement of an ideal. The law must prescribe 
a regime that the treaty has itself defined with sufficient specificity to direct the 
general course to be taken by the signatory states… 
To be a law with respect to ‘external affairs’, the law must be reasonably 
capable to being considered appropriate and adapted to implementing the 
treaty… 
It has been said that a law will not be capable of being seen as appropriate and 
adapted in the necessary sense unless it appears that there is ‘reasonable 
proportionality’ between that purpose or object and the means adapted by the 
law to pursue it. The notion of ‘reasonable proportionality’ will not always be 
particularly helpful….whether the law selects means which are reasonably 
capable of being considered appropriate and adapted to achieving the purpose 
or object of giving effect to the treaty, so that the law is one upon a subject 
which is an aspect of external affairs.40 
 
In this case, the provisions in the Commonwealth’s follow-on legislation 
prevented the termination of employment without valid reason or where the termination 
was ‘harsh, just or unconscionable’. The addition of the requirement that otherwise 
valid terminations not be ‘harsh, just or unconscionable’ went beyond the requirements 
of the Convention and to that extent were invalid. The lesson is thus that it is necessary 
to ensure that the drafting of the domestic follow-on legislation is consistent with the 
                                                     
36 Victoria v Commonwealth (Industrial Relations Act Case) 1996 187 CLR 416, 482. 
37 Sir Daryl Dawson, “The Constitution – Major Overhaul or Simple Tune-up?” (1984) 14 Melbourne 
University Law Review 353, 358. 
38 Victoria v Commonwealth (Industrial Relations Act Case) 1996 187 CLR 416, 486. 
39 For example, the provisions in the Commonwealth’s follow-on legislation that prevented the 
termination of employment without valid reason or where the termination was ‘harsh, just or 
unconscionable’ were invalid but severable (ibid 517-518). 
40 Ibid 486-488. 
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international instrument being followed.  
The lesson from the Industrial Relations Case is that the domestic follow-on 
legislation passed to implement the obligations that Australia has accepted under the 
relevant international instrument, must follow the terms of that instrument closely to 
count as a valid and reasonably adapted implementation of those treaty obligations in 
Australia. 
 
Would a Religious Freedom Act be valid under the Australian Constitution? 
 
That discussion brings us to the question of whether the Commonwealth has power 
to pass domestic legislation to implement its commitments under the Religion 
Declaration referred to above at note 1. Given that Australia ratified the ICCPR  in 
1980, it is not necessary to further consider whether protecting the religious freedom of 
Australia’s residents is a matter of sufficient international concern to enliven the 
Commonwealth’s power to pass follow-on domestic implementation legislation under 
the external affairs power in s 51 (xxix). That power is now beyond doubt given the 
authority of the decisions in the Tasmanian Dam and Industrial Relations Act cases and 
the residual question is thus what such follow-on legislation should look like to satisfy 
the rule that it was ‘appropriate and adapted’ to the purpose of the international 
instruments relied on – namely the ICCPR and the Religion Declaration. Because the 
power of the Commonwealth Parliament to pass a Religious Freedom Act has been by 
Australia’s Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission in its 1998 Report, I 
briefly set out the reasoning before I pass on to the residual question of what a 
Commonwealth Religious Freedom could or should look like. The Commission opined 
 
The Australian Constitution gives the Commonwealth power to make laws with 
respect to external affairs. This head of power enables the Commonwealth to 
make a law implementing an international treaty ratified or acceded to by 
Australia provided the law gives effect to the terms of the instrument in a 
reasonably appropriate and proportional way. 
Australia has ratified or otherwise indicated its support for a number of 
international instruments in the area of human rights. Some of them clearly 
foreshadow that they will be implemented through domestic legislation. ICCPR 
article 2 requires Australia to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its 
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the ICCPR, to 
take the necessary steps ... to adopt such legislative or other measures as may 
be necessary to give effect to the rights recognised in the ... Covenant and to 
ensure that any persons whose rights or freedoms ... are violated ... have an 
effective remedy. The Religion Declaration article 7 provides  
The rights and freedoms set forth in the present Declaration shall be 
accorded in national legislation in such a manner that everyone shall be 
able to avail himself of such rights and freedoms in practice.41  
The Attorney-General’s declaration that the Religion Declaration is an 
                                                     
41 Article 18, Freedom of religion and belief, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 
Australia, 1998, 13. 
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international instrument for the purposes of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission Act 1986 (Cth) is strong evidence that the Religion Declaration is a matter 
of sufficient concern to justify the passage of follow-on legislation under s 51(xxix) of 
the Australian Constitution. But even without the Attorney-General’s declaration 
referred to above,42 Australia’s ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 1966 (the ICCPR) on 13 August 1980 including its affirmation of 
freedom of religion and belief in Article 18, puts the matter beyond doubt. That is 
because Australia agreed under the ICCPR to ensure those rights to all individuals 
within its territory,43 to adopt legislation that will more fully enable those rights44 and 
because the ICCPR has now arguably been accepted as creating enforceable 
international law.45 
While the High Court has not been required to further consider what legislation 
satisfies the ‘appropriate and adapted’ interpretive rule since the Industrial Relations 
Act Case in 1996, the Federal Court was required to adjudicate related issues in Toben 
v Jones in 200346 and that Court’s treatment of the ‘appropriate and adapted’ 
requirement is instructive. 
Frederick Toben had challenged the validity of orders made by the Federal 
Court to enforce determinations earlier made by the Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission in 2000. Those orders had confirmed that various of his 
publications on a website as Director of the Adelaide Institute, had vilified Jews in 
breach of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) as amended in 1995. Toben 
appealed Branson J’s 2002 orders in the Federal Court to the Full Federal Court. He 
alleged that the 1995 amendments to Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) exceeded 
the legislative power of the Commonwealth under s 51(xxix) because the Racial 
Discrimination Convention47 relied on as the foundation of that legislative power, “was 
only intended to proscribe acts which could be characterised as expressions of racial 
hatred.”48  
While the Court agreed that “Part IIA of the Act d[id] not fully implement the 
Convention”,49 the Convention and other international instruments which Australia was 
obliged to enforce, were also  
                                                     
42 Ibid. 
43 ICCPR, Preamble and Article 2. 
44 Ibid, Article 2(2) and 3. 
45 “[M]any international lawyers argue that the [Universal] Declaration [of Human Rights] has come to 
form part of customary international law and in this way can be seen as binding on all 
nations…Australia has ratified both Covenants [the ICCPR and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights] and thereby agreed to assume the obligations they set out.” 
(George Williams, Sean Brennan and Andrew Lynch, Blackshield & Williams Australian 
Constitutional Law & Theory, 6th ed., The Federation Press, 2014, 1134-1135).  However as explained 
above in the text, these international obligations do not become binding in Australian domestic law 
until follow-on implementation legislation is passed by the Commonwealth Parliament. 
46 Toben v Jones (2003) 199 ALR 1. 
47 The International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (the Racial 
Discrimination Convention) adopted and opened for signature and ratification by General Assembly 
resolution 2106 on 21 December 1965 and entered into force on 4 January 1969 in accordance with 
Article 19; ratified by Australia on 30 September 1975 and used as the basis for the passage of the 
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) the same day. 
48 Toben v Jones (2003) 199 ALR 1, 9 [16] per Carr J. 
49 Ibid. 
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directed at deterring public expressions of offensive racial prejudice which 
might lead to acts of racial hatred and discrimination…[A] state party [c]ould 
legislate to ‘nip in the bud’ the doing of offensive, insulting, humiliating or 
intimidating public acts which are done because of race, colour or national or 
ethnic origin before such acts can grow into incitement or promotion of racial 
hatred or discrimination.50  
Citing the joint judgment in the Industrial Relations Act Case, Carr J continued 
that “it [wa]s for the legislature to choose the means by which it carrie[d] into or g[a]ve 
effect to a treaty”.51 Kiefel J concurred with Carr J on the constitutional issues arising, 
but Allsop J took judicial notice of the context when the Convention was conceived and 
then observed that State parties had agreed to rapidly pursue “a policy of eliminating 
racial discrimination in all its forms and promoting understanding among all races” by 
“all appropriate means”.52  
Allsop J went on to observe that Article 4(ii) of the Racial Discrimination 
Convention expected “immediate and positive measures”53 and Article 4(iii) expected 
States Parties “to declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based 
on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as acts of 
violence or incitement to such acts”.54 His Honour noted concern in the Commonwealth 
Parliament in 1974 and 1983 about how such measures would erode freedom of speech, 
and he noted the repetition of those concerns in the early 1990s.55 Proposed criminal 
sanctions were ultimately rejected, but the 1994 Bill made “acts unlawful which 
reasonably caused offence”.56 These amendments were made to “strengthen…social 
cohesion and [to] prevent…the undermining of tolerance in the Australian 
community”.57 He also cited the Attorney-General’s speech when the Amendment Bill 
was presented to the Parliament,58 but despite the appellant’s contention that the Act 
should be read down to “encompass only the expression of racial hatred”,59 “the context 
and aim of the Convention were” the elimination of racial discrimination in all its 
forms.60 “Absence of precision in the treaty…d[id] not lead to…a lack of obligation” 
on State Parties.61 Neither was “a deficiency” in the implementation of the 
Convention’s regime “fatal” to the constitutional validity of the implementing Act 
unless that deficiency was “so substantial as to deny the law the character of a measure 
implementing the Convention”.62 The law which the Commonwealth Parliament had 
passed was “reasonably capable of being considered as appropriate and adapted to 
implement the obligations” which arose under the Convention.63 While the law the 
Commonwealth had passed was “only one means of the achievement of the ideal”, it 
                                                     
50 Ibid 10 [19]. 
51 Ibid 10 [20] citing the Industrial Relations Act Case (1986), 487. 
52 Ibid 24 [104] citing Article 2(ii) of the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination (1965). 
53 Ibid 24 [107]. 
54 Ibid 21 [88]. 
55 Ibid 26 [114-117]. 
56 Ibid 31 [128]. 
57 Ibid 31 [129] quoting the Explanatory Memorandum to the 1995 Amendment Act. 
58 Ibid 32 [131]. 
59 Ibid 33 [133]. 
60 Ibid 33 [136]. 
61 Ibid 35 [140]. 
62 Ibid 35 [142] citing the Industrial Relations Act Case (1986), 488-489. 
63 Ibid 35 [144]. 
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was not inconsistent with the relevant part of the Convention.64 The balance to be struck 
“between freedom of speech and expressions of intimidation and hate” was “to be 
struck by Parliament”.65 
While the High Court in the Industrial Relations Act Case found that some 
provisions in the follow-on legislation in that case were not ‘appropriate and adapted’ 
to the purpose of the international instruments relied on, the Full Federal Court in Toben 
v Jones found that the 1995 amendments to the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) 
were ‘appropriate and adapted’. It did not matter that the amendments did not track the 
international convention exactly or were only partial because it could not be said that 
the non-alignment was “so substantial as to deny the law the character of a measure 
implementing the Convention.”66 It was for the Commonwealth Parliament to strike the 
appropriate domestic implementation balance for the Racial Discrimination 
Convention in Australia. 
Commonwealth legislation implementing international human rights 
instruments also has considerable potential to shape law and attitudes throughout 
Australia. For even though the Commonwealth legislature did not intend that the Racial 
Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) should override racial protection provisions in the later 
Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW), the High Court held that they did in Viskausas v 
Nilaud.67 The Commonwealth then amended its legislation in an effort to save the 
additional protection afforded by the New South Wales legislation,68 but that 
amendment and the further litigation that followed,69 confirmed that federal anti-
discrimination legislation will readily be interpreted by the High Court as creating a 
code that covers the field trumping state legislation that is in any way inconsistent with 
it. 
The decisions of both courts confirm that the power of the Commonwealth 
Parliament to legislate with respect to external affairs is not unlimited, but allows our 
legislators a ‘margin of appreciation’ to design legislation in a manner that meets 
Australian needs, even if that involves the partial or progressive implementation of the 
treaty obligations. What the Commonwealth Parliament cannot legislate is a regime 
that bears the name of an international convention but has no relationship to its terms. 
With this understanding of the Commonwealth Parliament’s power to pass domestic 
laws implementing Article 18 of the ICCPR and the Religion Declaration, I will now 
discuss why the domestic legislation of a comprehensive Religious Freedom Act should 
be Australia’s next human rights project. 
III.  Why should we now pass religious freedom legislation in Australia? 
In essence the answer to this question is that the human rights project in 
Australia has stalled because of distrust and can only be jump started if religious 
objection is engaged, understood and respectfully accommodated. But before we can 
                                                     
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid 36 [148]. 
66 Ibid 35 [142] citing the Industrial Relations Act Case (1986), 488-489. 
67 Viskausas v Nilaud (1983) 153 CLR 280. 
68 Section 6A(1) of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) now provides: 
This Act is not intended...to exclude or limit the operation of a law of a State or Territory that 
furthers the objects of the Convention and is capable of operating concurrently with this Act. 
69 University of Wollongong v Metwally (1984) 158 CLR 447. 
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discuss how that might be done, we need to understand why the development of human 
rights in Australia has slowed so much when there was genuine enthusiasm when the 
UDHR was originally expressed. However, because I want to focus on freedom of 
religion and conscience, I will not discuss Australia’s original antipathy towards racial 
toleration and equality nor how that was resolved on paper. I observe only that although 
freedom of religion and conscience got off to a better start, Australia has returned to its 
hesitant 1901 form. 
Freedom of Religion and Belief in Australia 
There are a variety of reasons why Australia has resisted human rights 
legislation in the past. Most recently the Rudd government rejected the Brennan 
Committee’s “31 recommendations…for improving and promoting human rights in 
Australia….[because] this would be divisive”.70 Some commentators have suggested 
the primary reasons for the rejection were seated deep within the Labor party itself.71 
Others have pointed to the continuing concerns of the churches.72 Patrick Parkinson has 
published reasons for those “Christian Concerns”73 and I will review those reasons 
because they are representative of religious objection generally and because it seems 
pointless to seek to protect the conscience rights of Australian religious believers if the 
majority of them are unsupportive for enduring legitimate reasons. However, I observe 
as a general principle, that human resistance to change because it is uncomfortable does 
not present as a worthy reason for resisting change that could improve important 
outcomes in any society. 
Political doubts about implementing human rights in Australia 
‘Labor Party’ resistance to change has been attributed to persuasive elements 
within the party which believed that human rights are anti-democratic and obstructive 
of efficient executive government management. The anti-democratic argument holds 
that Bills of Rights transfer a measure of government control from the elected members 
of the Parliament to ‘unelected judges’ who can then subvert Executive government 
action mandated by the electorate. The argument continues that under Australia’s 
Westminster form of democratic government, the Parliament should always be 
sovereign and that no judge should be able to tell the Parliament that it has overstepped. 
                                                     
70 Blackshield and Williams, above n 45, 1147-1148.  
71 <http://treatyrepublic.net/content/rudd-government-rejects-human-rights-charter> 
In fact, the most vehement opposition to a charter came from within the Labor Party, 
spearheaded by former New South Wales Premier Bob Carr. During his decade in office from 
1995 to 2005, Carr instituted a series of "law and order" measures, handing unprecedented 
powers to the police, boosting the state's jail population to record levels and backing the 
introduction of matching federal and state "anti-terrorism" legislation. 
Carr and other Labor figures demagogically claimed that any human rights law would hand 
power to "unelected" judges and override parliamentary sovereignty. In reality, their 
objections are to any restriction, however perfunctory, on the increasing tendency of executive 
governments to ram police-state measures through parliament, under the false pretence of 
protecting ordinary people from crime and terrorism. 
72 Carolyn Maree Evans, Legal Protection of Freedom of Religion in Australia, The Federation Press, 
Leichardt, New South Wales, 1990, 167 citing Patrick Parkinson, “Christian Concerns about an 
Australian Charter of Rights”, (2010) 15(2) Australian Journal of Human Rights 87 
73 Parkinson, above n 72. See also Patrick Parkinson, “Religious vilification, anti-discrimination laws 
and religious minorities in Australia: The freedom to be different”, (2007) 81 Australian Law Journal 
954, and Joel Harrison and Patrick Parkinson, “Freedom Beyond the Commons: Managing the Tension 
between Faith and Equality in a Multicultural Society”, 40 Monash Law Review, 2, 413. 
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While it is not the purpose of this paper to review the philosophical foundations of this 
argument, it is appropriate to observe that New Zealand and the United Kingdom have 
experimented with Human Rights Act protection models that are respectful of 
traditional Westminster parliamentary sovereignty but which have arguably improved 
human rights outcomes in both countries.74 While domestic Bills of Rights in the ACT 
and Victoria have not yet earned unequivocal pass marks when it comes to improving 
human rights outcomes in those jurisdictions, few have suggested that human rights 
generally are less protected in the ACT and Victoria than they were before their 
Charters of Rights were enacted. It is also appropriate to observe that Australia diluted 
parliamentary sovereignty in favour of the judiciary in a limited way at federation more 
than a century ago, and again, there has been no chorus of criticism suggesting that this 
limited dilution of the Diceyan ideal has had catastrophic consequences. 
Still it is impractical to ignore the lobbying power of elements within the 
political system resistant to change or the public apathy towards freedom of conscience 
and religion in generations raised without serious ideological bloodshed close at hand.75 
But what of the Christian objection that legislated or constitutionalized human rights 
never end up protecting religious liberty? What are those arguments and are there 
answers? 
Religious doubts about implementing human rights in Australia 
Carolyn Evans outlined the primary concern of religious organisations about 
human rights legislation when she wrote about non-discrimination laws in 2012.76  She 
said 
Most non-discrimination regimes, including Australia’s, began with quite 
substantial exemptions for religious bodies from the provisions of at least some 
of the discrimination laws….Over time, however, many countries, particularly 
in Europe, have seen the scope of exemptions for religious groups narrow. There 
has been increasing public debate in Australia over whether the exemptions in 
Australian discrimination Acts should likewise be narrowed.77 
The concern of religious organisations is that religious freedom gets diluted as 
newer demands for equality claim that religious exemptions are privileges that are 
inconsistent with open-ended equality. Evans then distinguishes between exemptions 
and exceptions. She uses the term ‘exception’ “to refer to provisions in the law that 
explicitly exclude a religious group from the operation of some or all of the 
requirements of the non-discrimination law.”78 Exemptions permit religious bodies “to 
discriminate with respect to a particular circumstance.”79 Religious bodies argue that 
contemporary demands for new ‘equalities’ seldom take a long term view and the 
human rights journey is thus punctuated with the continual erosion of individual 
                                                     
74 See for example, Blackshield and Williams, above n 45, 1141 citing the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 (NZ) and the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK). 
75 Writing in an American context, Martha Nussbaum has observed that the origins and wisdom of 
religious equality, and what she calls “the battle for equal respect...[must] be refought in each new era” 
(Martha C. Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience, Basic Books, New York, 2008, 361). 
76 Evans, above n 72, chapter 6. 
77 Ibid 139 citing Fyfe, Costello, Brennan, de Kretser and Croome. 
78 Ibid 140. 
79 Ibid. 
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conscience and religious group autonomy. Stand-alone claims that religious exceptions 
and exemptions are privileges and are unfair, never adequately balance the identity and 
dignity interests of religious conscience against trendy contemporary demands. 
Professor Patrick Parkinson has added that even though churches want human 
rights recognized, they do not believe that Charters assist.80  Their concerns stem from 
the perception that current standard form Charters “may be used to support agendas 
hostile to religious freedom”, do not always “enact the grounds of limitation contained 
in Article 18” of the ICCPR, and that “governmental human rights organisations [can 
be]…rather selective about the human rights they choose to support.”81 He says that 
the heart of Christian concerns…is that secular liberal interpretations of human 
rights Charters will tend to relegate religious freedom to the lowest place in an 
implicit hierarchy of rights established not by international law, but by the 
intellectual fashions of the day.82 
Although most Christian organisations support the ideology of anti-
discrimination law, the narrow interpretive approach taken by the institutions 
implementing any new version of equality to ‘genuine occupational requirements’ for 
jobs in church institutions, see the Christian “moral code”83 sidelined. If the government 
or its supervising human rights institutions consider society’s interest in promoting the 
new equality is sufficiently compelling, then they “curtail religious freedom”84 to the 
extent required to achieve the government goal despite lofty pronouncements about the 
foundationality and even the non-derogability of freedom of conscience and religion. 
Quoting McConnell, Parkinson says that even though governments assert that they do 
not take sides when religious and philosophical differences arise in society, the more 
recent idea that all citizens and their institutions also need to be neutral, prevents 
religious believers standing for anything they consider important.85 
In the context of an evangelical school “established to provide an explicitly 
Christian environment for children and young people”,86 it is as reasonable for the 
sponsors to seek employees who adhere to “the fundamentals of the Christian faith” as 
it is for the proprietors of a Thai restaurant to prefer Thai employees or the owners of a 
gay bar to want “to appoint only gay staff”.87 “A right of positive selection is rather 
different from discrimination”.88 The law should not proscribe reliance on 
characteristics which are relevant to employment.89 Such affirmative selection is 
essential to the maintenance of multiculturalism because it promotes diversity90 and 
because it imbues our society with a hybrid vigour that is lost when the law imposes 
homogeneity requirements. 
Parkinson goes on to explain that the churches are skeptical about the 
                                                     
80 Patrick Parkinson, above n 72, 83. 
81 Ibid.  
82 Ibid 87. 
83 Ibid 89 
84 Ibid 90. 
85 Ibid 91. 
86 Ibid 94. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid 96.  
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implementation of further Charters in Australia since Victoria did such a poor job of 
implementing the religious limitation in the ICCPR. Instead of copying it and 
confirming that religious freedom should only be limited if limitation is necessary “to 
protect public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
others”,91 the Victorian drafters created a general balancing provision with so much 
discretion that the necessity provision in Article 18(3) was eviscerated.92 But Parkinson 
concedes that even the “[p]roper enactment of the protections for religious freedom in 
the ICCPR” would not sweep away all the church concerns.93 The fact that Victoria 
understood very well the concerns about medical doctor conscience when it passed the 
Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic), did not protect that conscience at all.94 Parkinson 
says that Frank Brennan was absolutely right in his scathing criticism: 
This was the first real test of the Victorian Charter of Human Rights and 
Responsibilities and it failed spectacularly to protect a core non-derogable 
ICCPR human right.95 
Even though a Victorian law which protected doctor conscience might not have 
protected doctors with conscience concerns about even peripheral involvement in 
abortion if that law was interpreted narrowly, still the anti-religious belief bias would 
not have been as palpable.96  
After noting the view of some influential Australian human rights advocates 
that many religious beliefs were discriminatory and unacceptable in our pluralist, 
secular society,97 Parkinson concluded that  
Christians who are opposed to a Charter of Rights…would be less opposed…if 
they thought that the legislators and policy makers would take all human rights 
seriously, and faithfully protect freedom of religion and conscience in the 
manner required by Art 18 of the ICCPR and other human rights instruments. 
The suspicion that those advocating for a charter don’t take freedom of religion 
and conscience nearly seriously enough – a concern which has been fuelled by 
the track record of the human rights lobby and the drafting of the two Charters 
that already exist in Australia – has certainly played a significant part in 
enlivening opposition to a national Charter.98 
Writing more recently with Joel Harrison, Parkinson has opined that the 
competing dignity demands of religious believers and those who consider that their 
beliefs are misogynistic and homophobic could be reconciled if it were accepted that 
anti-discrimination norms should only apply in public space – the commons.99 Their 
admittedly incomplete project suggests that a multicultural society needs ‘mediating 
                                                     
91 ICCPR Article 18(3). 
92 Parkinson, above n 72, 98-101. 
93 Ibid 101. 
94 Ibid 104. 
95 Ibid 105 quoting Frank Brennan “The place of the religious viewpoint in shaping law and policy in a 
pluralistic democratic society: a case study on rights and conscience”, paper given at the conference 
Values and Public Policy: Fairness, Diversity and Social Change, Centre for Public Policy, University 
of Melbourne, 19 February 2009. 
96 Ibid 106. 
97 Ibid 109-113 citing Tom Calma, Denise Meyerson and Michael Gorton. 
98 Ibid 114. 
99 Harrison and Parkinson, above n 73.  
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institutions’; not in the sense that they facilitate balance between “two poles of 
authority”,100 but in perhaps De Tocqueville’s 1830s sense that they recognize and 
enable separate lawful sources of identity which protect the individual as a bulwark of 
liberty against the encroaching power of the state.101 
Part of the thesis of this paper is that the articulation of freedom of conscience 
and religion in the UDHR and ICCPR has always been thin and incomplete. The vision 
of freedom of conscience there expressed was always a work in progress and is 
inadequate when compared with the legislative substance that is provided for other 
freedoms in stand-alone acts that can run to 70 or more clauses. The Religion 
Declaration shows that the religious part of conscience is multi-faceted and requires 
more detail that was expressed in 1948 and 1966 when the UN was struggling to find 
generalities acceptable behind the Iron and Bamboo curtains and in the Middle East. 
Carolyn Evans has suggested internationally that the prospects of creating a more 
specific and detailed Treaty or Convention to protect freedom of religion and 
conscience are slim for the same reasons as in the past.102 But that does not mean that 
there is not enough material for Australia to work with in passing its own federal 
Religious Freedom Act. There is enough detail in the ICCPR and the Religion 
Declaration to justify comprehensive Australian legislation and as freedom of religion 
and conscience has come under siege internationally, there have been many legal cases 
that show how such a new Act could be framed. Indeed, I suggest that the proliferation 
of litigation challenging religious conscience provides material that can enable 
Australian legislators to demonstrate their commitment to freedom of conscience and 
liberty. Such legislation could be so detailed and specific that it may convince the 
churches and religious believers that the Parliament was ‘serious’ about freedom of 
conscience and religion - to use Parkinson’s word - and ‘serious’ enough to make it 
difficult for secularly minded judges to dilute the freedoms intended. The real question 
is how the political will to pass such legislation could be mustered, but the answer to 
that question is beyond the scope of this paper. 
IV. What a Commonwealth Religious Freedom Act could look like? 
In its 1998 report entitled Article 18, Freedom of religion and belief103 HREOC 
recommended that the Commonwealth enact a Religious Freedom Act which would 
cover the following matters: 
- It should recognize and give effect to the right to freedom of religion and 
belief104 
- The right of all religions to exist, organize and determine their own affairs 
within the law and according to their own tenets105 
- All rights and freedoms recognized in Article 18 of the ICCPR and the Religion 
                                                     
100 Ibid 436. 
101 Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, David Campbell Publishers Ltd, Everymans 
Library, London, originally published 1830, copyright 1945, renewed 1972, Vol 1, 303-308, Vol 2, 20-
28. 
102 Carolyn Maree Evans, “Time for a Treaty? The Legal Sufficiency of the Declaration on the 
Elimination of All Forms on Intolerance and Discrimination”, 3 (2007) BYU Law Review 617. 
103 Article 18, Freedom of religion and belief, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 
Australia, 1998. 
104 Ibid, v, R2.1. 
105 Ibid, v ,R2.2. 
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Declaration including but not limited to 
a) freedom to hold a particular religion or belief 
b) freedom not to hold such 
c) freedom to manifest religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and 
teaching 
d) freedom from coercion which would impair religion or belief 
e) the right of parents and guardians to organize family life in accordance with 
their religion or beliefs 
f) freedom from discrimination on ground of religion or belief106 
- such freedom of conscience and religion would be subject only to those 
limitations prescribed by law and necessary to protect public safety, health or 
morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others107 
-  the definition of religion would be wide and inclusive but would but not so 
wide as to include beliefs occasioned by mental illness108 
- the obligations should apply to individuals, corporations, public and private 
bodies and all other legal persons109 
- it should make unlawful all direct and indirect discrimination on the ground of 
religion and belief in all areas of public life subject to two exceptions 
a) any preference (including on grounds of religious belief) because of the 
inherent requirements of a job should not be unlawful, and 
b) similarly any preference (including on grounds of religious belief) because 
of the need to avoid injury to the religious susceptibilities should not be 
unlawful provided it is not arbitrary and is consistently applied110 
- the offence of blasphemy should be abolished in all States and Territories111 
- the advocacy of religious hatred, discrimination and violence should be 
proscribed but with an exemption for good faith 
a) works of art 
b) any communication for a genuine academic, artistic, scientific or public 
interest purpose, and 
c)  news reports in the public interest112 
- its process and remedies should be civil remedies similar to those provided in 
the racial hatred provisions of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth).113 
HREOC confirmed, as Professor Parkinson has noted,114 that the UN Human Rights 
Committee “does not permit any limitations whatsoever on the freedom of thought or 
conscience or on the freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of one’s choice.”115 
                                                     
106 Ibid, v, R2.3. 
107 Ibid, v, R2.4. 
108 Ibid, vi, R2.5. 
109 Ibid, vi, R2.6. 
110 Ibid, viii, R4.1. 
111 Ibid, ix, R5.1. 
112 Ibid, ix, R5.3. 
113 Ibid, ix, R5.4. 
114 Parkinson, above n 72, 96 where he observed that churches in Australia are skeptical about the 
implementation of Human Right Charters since the Victorian Charter ignore the requirement under 
Article 18(3) of the ICCPR that religious freedom should only be limited if such limitation was 
necessary “to protect public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
others”. Instead, the Victorian drafters created a general balancing provision with so much discretion 
that the necessity provision was eviscerated (ibid 98-101). 
115 Article 18, Freedom of religion and belief, above n 103, 10, quoting UN General Comment No. 22 
(1993) paragraph 3. 
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HREOC continued quoting the UN Human Rights Committee, that “freedom of thought 
and conscience or…the freedom to have or adopt a religion of one’s choice…are 
protected unconditionally.”116 Limitations in the public interest only apply to 
manifestations of religion if required by law and necessary in the interests of the public 
safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 
Since the Victorian Charter of Rights does not follow the ICCPR or UN General 
Comment No. 22 to the extent it does not enable the unconditional protection of doctor 
conscience in Victoria, it is submitted that a Commonwealth Religious Freedom Act 
should be declared a code for Australia intended to ‘cover the field’ and trump any 
inconsistent state legislation under s 109 of the Australian Constitution to ensure overall 
Australian compliance with the applicable international instruments.117 
HREOC’s Recommendation 2.3 referred specifically to Articles 1, 5 and 6 of 
the Religion Declaration with non-exclusive examples. The table in appendix A 
provides a list of examples including litigated cases where proponents of freedom of 
conscience and religion believe that freedom of conscience and religion was not 
considered properly, was unreasonably challenged or was interfered with in the result. 
I suggest that the examples in the table should be used to prepare sections in a new 
Commonwealth Religious Freedom Act consistent with the ICCPR and Religion 
Declaration. Legislative provisions crafted to protect freedom of religious belief and 
practice could ensure that judicial decisions inconsistent with freedom of religious 
belief and practice are not legally possible in Australia.  
The point of this discussion has been to show that if the Australian 
Commonwealth Parliament chose to honour its commitments to protect freedom of 
religious belief and practice under the ICCPR and the Religion Declaration, it has the 
power to do so. Not only could detailed domestic legislation be tailored so that it fell 
within the constitutional external affairs power, but it could be designed to satisfy the 
minority religious believers who Professor Parkinson suggests have lost faith in human 
rights as a way to protect their beliefs and practices.118 And if minority believers were 
satisfied after a trial period that their religious liberty could be and had been 
satisfactorily protected by a Commonwealth Religious Freedom Act, then the prospect 
of other human rights legislation in Australia would have been enhanced. 
V.  Conclusion 
Visionary Australians were involved in chartering the UN, adopting the UDHR 
and ratifying the ICCPR and, the ICESCR. Further visionary Australians ratified and 
implemented the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (the Race Convention) and the 1981 Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. They have made Australia 
                                                     
116 Ibid. 
117 Current High Court interpretation of s 109 of the Australian Constitution holds that state law 
inconsistent with valid Commonwealth law passed to cover the field on a particular topic, trumps 
inconsistent state law to the extent of the inconsistency. While s 109 provides that the inconsistent state 
law is invalid to the extent of the inconsistency, the High Court has interpreted that provision to mean 
that the inconsistent state law is merely inoperative for the duration of the inconsistency (Carter v Egg 
and Egg Pulp Marketing Board (Vic) (1942) 66 CLR 557, 573 per Latham CJ; see also Western 
Australia v Commonwealth (Native Title Act Case) (1995) 183 CLR 373). 
118 Above n 72. 
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a better place. It has been slow and patient work, but their vision and persistence has 
improved the Australia they left to later generations. But the most challenging 
improvement envisaged by those pioneers, remains to be implemented. That is because 
it has always been difficult to achieve a high level of consensus about the importance 
of freedom of religious belief and practice.  
I have shown that the domestic legislation of a Commonwealth Religious 
Freedom Act is within the existing legislative power of the Australian Commonwealth 
Parliament without the need for constitutional amendment confirmed by a referendum. 
Such legislation would satisfy the commitments Australia has made to implement 
Article 18 of the UDHR and the ICCPR, as well all the provisions of the Religion 
Declaration. That is because there has been ‘international concern’ about freedom of 
religious belief and practice since at least 1945 and because Australia has made 
commitments under the international instruments that have followed. The binding 
ICCPR covenant which Australia ratified in 1980, and the follow on Religion 
Declaration which she ratified a year later, spell out some of the detail that could be 
included in domestic implementation legislation.  
I have also shown from Australian federal case law that Australian 
implementation legislation does need not to correspond exactly with the international 
instruments that legislation is implementing. It can be tailored to address Australia’s 
unique religious belief and practice problems, provided it is reasonably adapted to that 
purpose. 
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Appendix A 
Adverse cases Draft provision Religious 
Declaration 
reference 
point 
Christian Youth Camps 
Limited & Ors v Cobaw 
Community Health Services 
Limited & Ors [2014] VSCA 
75 (16 April 2014); Lee v 
Ashers Bakery Co Ltd & Anor 
[2015] NICity 2; Gifford v 
McCarthy (2016) NY Slip Op 
00230; Elane Photography 
LLC v Willock (2013) NMSC 
-040, 309 P. 3d, 53; Ontario 
(Human Rights Commission) 
v Brockie [2002 22 DLR (4th) 
174; Wheaton College v 
Burwell 791 F. 3d 792 (7th 
Circuit 2015) 
No provider of goods or services 
shall be obliged to provide services 
to any person or organization where 
the provider or its directing mind has 
a bona fide conscience objection to 
doing so, provided that this rule shall 
not apply in any case where the 
conscience objection is premised on 
the race or ethnic background of the 
proposed service recipient. Neither 
shall goods or service providers with 
conscience objections breach any 
anti-discrimination norm by posting 
a notice in their place of business 
advising potential customers of their 
conscience objection to the provision 
of particular goods and services 
Articles 1-4, 
6-8. 
 
 
Catch the Fires Ministry Inc v 
Islamic Council of Victoria 
[2006] VSCA 284; Pastor 
Ake Green Case B 1050 05, 29 
November 2005;119 
Archbishop Julian Porteous 
(Tasmania, Australia – case 
did not proceed); Bishop 
Frederick Henry Alberta, 
Canada – case did not 
proceed); Chamberlain v 
Surrey School District No. 36 
[2002] 2 SCR 235 
No person or institution involved in 
the publication of any spoken or 
written material for bona fide 
conscience purposes shall breach any 
anti-discrimination norm by reason 
of such publication, but this 
protection shall not extend to any 
publication required by law and 
necessary in the interests of the 
public safety, order, health or morals 
or the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of others 
Articles 1-4, 
6-8. 
Eweida v British Airways PC 
[2010] EWCA Civ 80; 
Mandia v Dowell-Lee [1983] 
2 AC 548;  Sikh headgear 
cases120 
It shall be unlawful to pass a law or 
impose a rule or policy that requires 
any person to wear or not to wear 
anything that would interfere with 
that person’s bona fide conscience 
beliefs, but this protection shall not 
extend to any item required by law 
Articles 1-4, 
6-8. 
                                                     
119 
<https://web.archive.org/web/20120218220008/http://www.domstol.se/Domstolar/hogstadomstolen/Av
goranden/2005/Dom_pa_engelska_B_1050-05.pdf>. 
120 < http://fateh.sikhnet.com/s/NYPDLandmark>. 
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and necessary in the interests of the 
public safety, order, health or morals 
or the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of others 
Hozack v Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints 
[1997] FCA 1300 (27 
November 1997); Challenges 
to Catholic Education Office 
right to terminate employees 
on agreed moral grounds;121 
Trinity Western University v 
British Columbia College of 
Teachers [2001] SCR 772; 
Strydom v Nederduitse 
Gereformeede Gemeente, 
Mooreletta Park (2009) 4 SA 
510 (Equality Court , TPA, 
South Africa) 
No employer, whether a person or an 
institution, who subscribes to a bona 
fide conscience ethos, shall breach 
any law by the announcement, 
imposition or observance of a rule or 
policy that requires employees to be 
faithful to that conscience ethos if 
that employer has given notice of that 
conscience ethos to prospective 
employees before the 
commencement of employment. Nor 
shall such employer breach any law 
by taking disciplinary action 
(including the termination of 
employment) to enforce employee 
fidelity to that conscience ethos if the 
prospect of such discipline was made 
clear in the pre-employment notice. 
Articles 1-4, 
6-8. 
Victorian and ACT abortion 
laws; College of Physicians 
and Surgeons of Ontario 
No person who has a conscience 
objection to involvement in any 
medical procedure shall be required 
to be involved in any process or 
action touching or concerning that 
medical procedure. Any employer or 
institution which takes action against 
such person in breach of this section 
commits a Commonwealth offence. 
Penalty – 1000 penalty units 
Articles 1-4, 
6-8. 
Dielman; Wilkie v Preston 
and Stallard [2016] TAMC 
(27 July 2016) 
No person who conducts a peaceful 
protest in any public place to express 
a bona fide conscience belief, shall 
breach any law, but this rule shall not 
protect any peaceful protest which 
physically endangers the public 
safety, order, health or morals or the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of 
others. For the sake of clarity, no 
peaceful protest that merely offends 
another person shall be deemed to 
Articles 1-4, 
6-8. 
                                                     
121  For example, Evans and Ujvari advise that the Catholic Education Office in Victoria seeks to 
discriminate against employees who break their agreed moral code by virtue of exemptions in the 
Victorian legislation (Carolyn Evans and Leilani Ujvari, “Non-discrimination laws and religious 
schools in Australia”, (2009) 30 Adelaide Law Review 31, 33-35).  
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have interfered with public safety, 
order, health, morals or the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of 
that other person. Any person, 
institution or government which 
takes action against a peaceful 
protester in breach of this section 
commits a Commonwealth offence. 
Penalty – 1000 penalty units. 
Paid religious advertising 
must be aired on public media 
No person, corporation or other 
institution providing commercial 
advertising to the public may refuse 
to publish any advertisement or 
message which has been paid for on 
standard commercial terms unless 
that advertisement or message would 
endanger the public safety, order, 
health or morals, or the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of others. For the 
sake of clarity, no advertisement or 
message that merely offends another 
person shall be deemed to have 
endangered the public safety, order, 
health, morals or the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of that other 
person. Any person, institution or 
government which refuses to publish 
an advertisement or message in 
breach of this section commits a 
Commonwealth offence. Penalty – 
1000 penalty units. 
Articles 1-4, 
6-8. 
Public institutions must not 
take moral positions contrary 
to religious belief without 
consent of a majority of their 
shareholders 
Save for paid advertisements 
published by news media 
organisations, no corporation may 
publish any message on a moral issue 
unless that corporation has first 
obtained consent from a majority of 
its shareholders in a general meeting 
or special general meeting. Any 
person, institution or government 
which refuses to publish an 
advertisement or message in breach 
of this section commits a 
Commonwealth offence. Penalty – 
1000 penalty units. 
Articles 1 & 
8; ICCPR  
Article 2. 
Davis v Miller , 
https://www.scribd.com/docu
No person employed to provide 
goods or services to the public shall 
Articles 1-4, 
22
Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics, Vol. 7 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://researchonline.nd.edu.au/solidarity/vol7/iss1/3
ment/310025455/Miller-v-
Davis. 
 
be required to provide those goods or 
services in breach of a bona fide 
conscience objection unless the 
employer gave the employee notice 
of that requirement before the 
commencement of employment. 
Where a requirement to provide 
goods or services in breach of a bona 
fide conscience objection is imposed 
by law after the commencement of 
employment and the employer had 
given no saving notice, the employer 
shall thereafter be obliged to provide 
the employee with alternative duties 
which do not offend the employee’s 
bona fide conscience objection. Any 
employer which takes any action 
against an employee which renders 
the employee’s employment less 
favourable because of the bona fide 
conscience, objection commits a 
Commonwealth offence. Penalty – 
1000 penalty units. 
6-8. 
Parental opt out rights for 
children from education 
programs contrary to their 
beliefs 
No parent or guardian of a child shall 
be required to have the child attend 
an educational program that offends 
the bona fide conscience of that 
parent or guardian. Any educational 
institution which conducts 
educational programs that offend the 
bona fide conscience of a parent or 
guardian, shall provide the child with 
an alternative educational program 
that does not offend the bona fide 
conscience of that parent of guardian. 
Any educational institution which 
does not provide any child with an 
education program that does not 
offend the bona fide conscience of 
that parent, commits a 
Commonwealth offence. Penalty – 
1000 penalty units. 
Article 5 
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